NATO’s military and economic power may dwarf Russia’s, but for former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy Ian Brzezinski, the question is whether the alliance is prepared to actually use it to ward off further Russian armed aggression.
“Do we have the kit necessary to respond robustly? Do we have the kit necessary to deter such an event? Absolutely,” Brzezinski tells Independence Avenue Media. “The real question is: Does the NATO community, the transatlantic community, have the mindset necessary to exercise that power?”
Brzezinski, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, says warnings from Baltic and Polish leaders about a possible limited military or hybrid provocation should be taken seriously. He points to what he describes as “intensifying” Russian actions short of open war, including attacks on European infrastructure, violence against dissidents and drone incursions into Poland.
He argues that NATO’s failure to impose meaningful costs for such actions has encouraged Moscow to escalate. Efforts to avoid a wider confrontation, he says, may instead increase the likelihood of a more provocative Russian move.
Brzezinski, who, under President George W. Bush, coordinated with NATO on operations in the Western Balkans, Mediterranean, Afghanistan and Iraq, also opposes any Trump administration attempt to further reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe. He describes the current American force posture as already “pretty slim.” Aside from raising questions about Washington’s commitment to European security, withdrawing additional forces from Europe, he argues, would embolden the United States’ antagonists.
The conversation also addresses the vulnerabilities of NATO’s eastern flank, the future of NATO enlargement and the lessons of Russia’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia. Brzezinski, who advised the Ukrainian government in the 1990s, calls that war a “shot across the bow” to which the West failed to respond, boosting Moscow’s confidence that further aggression would not produce a decisive transatlantic response.
This interview was recorded on July 21, 2026, and has been edited for length and clarity.
Kartlos Sharashenidze, Independence Avenue Media: Baltic and Polish leaders are warning that Russia could launch a limited military or hybrid provocation against NATO. Vilnius says it has intelligence suggesting Moscow may be planning attacks on critical infrastructure in the Baltic states or Poland. How do you assess these warnings?
Ian Brzezinski, Atlantic Council senior fellow, former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy: I think we have to take it very seriously for two reasons: One, the Poles and the Baltics and our other allies have actually pretty good intelligence on Russia. And I would say the Poles and the Baltics are among those who best understand Russian strategic culture and thinking. And then, second, there’s precedent. Russia has been conducting hybrid warfare against the West, against our European allies, for well over a decade. And over the last several years, it’s been intensifying.
Of course, we shouldn’t forget we’ve had cable-cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea [allegedly] conducted at the behest of the Russians and by the Russians. We’ve had the Russians [allegedly] cut cables between Svalbard and mainland Norway. And then, of course, we’ve had assassinations by the Russians across Europe. We’ve had violence against Russian dissidents across Europe. We had a terrorist attack on a Polish rail line within the last year. And then, of course, last September, the Russians launched some 20 to 23 drones deep into Poland.
So, the Baltics and Poland are very justified in issuing this warning.
IAM: When would NATO consider an attack on critical infrastructure — like the ones you just laid out — to be covered by Article 5 (the North Atlantic Treaty’s collective defense provision)?
Brzezinski: Well, there’s no clear “line” with that. But what I can say is that the alliance and the United States, North America and Europe have failed to respond adequately to this long litany of Russian hybrid attacks, actions short of war, against its territory and its peoples.
And, in fact, I would argue that that drone attack on Poland was an act of war. I mean, these were military drones that were sent in a premeditated fashion deep into Poland. And the West hasn’t responded to that action other than waving a finger and saying this is dangerous and unjustified. There weren’t even economic sanctions taken in response to that.
So, in a way, the Western community of democracies, the transatlantic community, has actually encouraged Russia to escalate because they don’t adequately respond to these acts of aggression.
IAM: Why haven’t we seen an adequate response from NATO?
Brzezinski: Well, within the alliance, it’s always tough to get consensus. And I think among most nations in the alliance, there’s a feeling that it’s not worth escalating the conflict. And that’s why they’ve been generally passive in response to these aggressions.
And it’s been a mistake. It actually increases the risk of the Russians doing something even more precarious, more dangerous, more provocative, which, of course, increases the risk of a wider war, which is what we’re all trying to prevent.
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IAM: What do you see as the most immediate threat Russia poses to Europe today?
Brzezinski: The most immediate threat it is posing is not even a threat, it’s an action. It’s unjustified, unprovoked and brutal aggression against Ukraine, which is an attempt to suborn an independent democratic state that has been a de facto NATO ally in terms of sending its troops in support of allied operations.
That [Russian] action is a threat to Ukraine, it’s a threat to the principle of sovereignty, and it’s a threat to the credibility of the NATO alliance. So, that’s the issue of the day that we should be focusing on and stepping up our actions to help support the Ukrainians to defeat this invasion and end the war on its terms.
IAM: Of course, the war in Ukraine is ongoing, but beyond Ukraine, you mentioned the hybrid operations Russia has carried out over the years. What threats do you see to the Baltic states and to Poland specifically? What are your expectations there?
Brzezinski: Well, I’m worried that, as the situation for Russia becomes worse in Ukraine, it will attempt to change that situation by escalating horizontally, by doing something provocative, kinetic against a NATO ally; a NATO ally that it feels is most vulnerable and who would have the greatest difficulty in generating a unified and robust response from the alliance.
No particular scenario stands out as most immediate or most urgent, but everyone has to keep their eyes on the Baltic states and the Arctic. I think those are the two areas of greatest concern for me.
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IAM: Let me ask you about the U.S. military presence in Europe. Behind the headlines, what does that presence look like today? What is Washington planning to change, and how do you see this process unfolding?
Brzezinski: Well, today we have somewhere with roughly 70,000 to 80,000 troops, U.S. military personnel, deployed and stationed in Europe. Of that, about 60,000 are permanently stationed in Europe. That is, they have their military bases there. The personnel live there year-round; they’re not rotated in and out of Europe.
That is less than a third of what we had during the height of the Cold War, which is roughly 300,000-plus troops. That’s 300,000-plus troops and personnel in Europe defending transatlantic interests.
Today the Trump administration has signaled that it wants to further reduce America’s military presence in Europe. I think it’s a mistake. It rests on a false assumption that these elements of our force structure are an excessive burden on the United States military, and it becomes an inhibiting, a limiting, a weakening factor in our ability to respond to crises elsewhere in the world.
But I would point out that those 62,000 troops that are permanently stationed in Europe constitute less than 6%, probably less than 5%, of the United States’ overall force structure. That is, a force structure of professional, full-time military personnel, which is about 1.3 million. And I’m not even taking into account our reserve forces and National Guard, which jacked that number up to 2 million.
Of the 30 F-35 squadrons that we have, only two are permanently stationed in Europe. Of our F-16 squadrons, [of] which we have roughly 27, 28 or 29, depending on how you count, only four are permanently stationed in Europe.
And when you think of high-value, low-density items like Patriot air defense systems, of the 15 batteries the United States has, which will soon become 18 batteries, only one is permanently stationed in Europe.
So, our force structure is pretty slim and barely a burden on our ability to respond elsewhere in the world. And I would argue, in light of the significance of the transatlantic security relationship, the interests the United States has, the vital interests the United States has in Europe, we ought to be increasing our force posture as the Europeans increase their defense capabilities going forward. But I have to admit that that is a minority position in the United States.
IAM: What happens if American forces leave before Europe is ready to replace them? And after the NATO summit, do you see any coordination between Washington and Europe on the timeline?
Brzezinski: Well, the Europeans are trying to coordinate some sort of timeline with the Trump administration and its plans. The Ankara [NATO] summit, for me, was a time when the Europeans were stepping up and the United States was actually stepping back, which to me is disappointing and concerning.
The Europeans demonstrate they’re stepping up by demonstrating at the summit their commitment and their progress in living up to the Hague summit commitments; that is, to increase defense spending as a total to 5% of GDP. And a lot of countries in NATO are making significant progress in that regard.
The United States, unfortunately, brought to the alliance a dark cloud that overhung the summit meetings. That included plans to do a force-posture review, a national defense strategy that signaled an intent to further reduce our forces.
And I would say when the United States is reducing its forces from Europe, it’s actually emboldening our adversaries. It’s raising questions about America’s commitment to Europe, and that’s unhelpful. We have the resources to do more in Europe, there’s an urgency to do so, and we should actually be increasing our force posture in Europe.
IAM: After the Ankara summit, do you have any reason to be more optimistic about transatlantic relations?
Brzezinski: Well, the summit had some positive dimensions to it. It demonstrated that the Europeans are fully committed to supporting Ukraine. They committed 70 billion [euros] for this year in security assistance support to Kyiv. They promised to do another 70 billion of security assistance next year, in 2027.
In some ways, it was a scorecard summit in that the European allies, even the Canadians, made very clear and provided evidence of their commitment to increase their defense spending to 5% and the progress they’re making.
They rolled out over $50 billion in defense contracts to build up that force capability. And so that was very, very, very positive.
But while there weren’t any political explosions at Ankara, I think it reinforced a kind of trepidation among Europeans that the United States is, under Trump, gradually withdrawing from Europe.
IAM: You mentioned that the situation for Russia is getting worse in Ukraine. At the same time, Ukrainian strikes are reaching deep inside Russia. What does that mean for Russia’s ability to test NATO? How does it fit into this picture?
Brzezinski: The good news of Ukrainian success is that it reduces Russia’s ability to really stand up against NATO or to confidently exercise aggression against NATO.
But as Ukraine succeeds more and more on the battlefield, it’s going to probably increase the likelihood that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin will panic. And one way he may try to reverse the course of the war would be, as we discussed, horizontal escalation, by perhaps executing some sort of aggression against NATO or a NATO member state.
The idea being it would try and create divisions within the alliance that would break down support for Ukraine.
IAM: In a few weeks, it will be 18 years since Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia. Looking back, did the West miss the warning about what was coming next?
Brzezinski: Well, 2008 should have been, or was, a shot across the bow that the transatlantic community should have recognized and taken action on.
Instead, after Russia was pushed out of most, but not all, of Georgia, we immediately went back to normal relations with Russia for reasons that are beyond me. But that further emboldened [then Russian Prime Minister] Putin.
And clearly, as we see today, he hasn’t given up on his ambitions to suborn Georgia. And it certainly gave him confidence that he could act against Ukraine without a decisive transatlantic response. So that was the consequences of what happened in 2008 against Georgia.
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IAM: We’ve been talking about the possibility that Russia could test NATO. But what about countries outside the alliance, especially Georgia and Armenia? What risks do they face from Russia?
Brzezinski: The risk is that Putin, panicking because of the situation in Ukraine turning against him, is to lash out horizontally. And while I have a tendency to focus on the Arctic and on the Baltics as potential contingencies, we shouldn’t forget about the leverage that he has over the countries of the Caucasus.
And he is still clearly smarting over his loss of Armenia, which has decided to shift the focus of its relationships with the West.
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IAM: How do you see the future of NATO enlargement? Is that realistic in the near future?
Brzezinski: It depends how you define “near future.” Clearly, within the next two years, when President [Donald] Trump is in office in Washington, it’s very unlikely there’ll be another round of extending membership to those countries who apply for NATO membership, like Ukraine, or, for that matter, others, like Moldova or perhaps in the Western Balkans.
But the vision of a Europe that’s whole and free, undivided, complete, to use those terms, won’t be fulfilled until Ukraine is a full member. And I would argue even Georgia is a full member. But that won’t happen, I think, as long as President Trump is in office.
Hopefully, the next American president will have a sounder strategic vision and will reanimate America’s commitment to the vision of a Europe undivided, whole and free.
And people may say that sounds far-fetched today, but I remember, in the not-too-distant past, at the [2023] Vilnius NATO summit … there was near consensus within the alliance on initiating a serious process to bring Ukraine into the NATO alliance.
And there are only two countries that were really blocking that. That was the United States under President [Joe] Biden and Germany. And I would have argued, if President Biden had decided to support that Ukrainian ambition, the Germans would have swung behind.
So, there is ample precedent to be confident that, in the long run, the vision of a Europe whole and free will include a NATO that includes countries like Ukraine.
IAM: This is my very last question, to bring us back to where we started: Is NATO actually ready for the scenario Baltic and Polish leaders are warning about?
Brzezinski: Do we have the kit necessary to respond robustly? Do we have the kit necessary to deter such an event? Absolutely.
There is massive alliance overmatch against Russian power. Think of just the economic weight. We’re talking about some $60 trillion in combined GDP against roughly $2 trillion in Russian GDP.
We’re talking about $1.5 trillion in defense spending versus $200 billion or less defense spending [in 2025] in Russia.
We’re talking about an alliance that has an extensive set of relationships beyond the North Atlantic area, involving partners in the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and elsewhere. So, the overmatch of power that NATO has over Russia is truly overwhelming.
The real question is: Does NATO have, does the NATO community, the transatlantic community have the mindset necessary to exercise that power that will effectively deter Russia from taking such a precarious and dangerous and provocative move [as an attack beyond Ukraine]?
And if it does, will they [NATO] have the mindset to respond with an appropriate punitive action that will ensure that Russia backs off and doesn’t do it again? Here, I’m a little bit uncertain.
