A former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine says that it is not too late for President Donald Trump to achieve an elusive peace deal between Kyiv and Moscow — but to do so he must ramp up the pressure on the Kremlin.
Trump “said that if one of the parties blocked a deal, he would put major pressure on them,” says John Herbst, now the senior director of the Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. “But so far, Trump has been reluctant to take those steps.”
In a wide-ranging interview with Independence Avenue Media, Herbst argues that Russia’s war against Ukraine is increasingly favoring Kyiv, while the Kremlin is facing mounting military, economic and political pressure at home.
Herbst says U.S. sanctions imposed on Lukoil and Rosneft in October 2025 were the types of steps needed to increase the pressure on Moscow. But these sanctions themselves were partially waived for two months during the conflict in Iran, and Herbst argued that Washington should do more, including supporting the transfer to Ukraine of more than 200 euros in frozen Russian assets currently held in the EU.
But Herbst, who was ambassador to Ukraine during the administration of President George W. Bush, pushes back on claims that Trump is pressuring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to hand over Ukraine’s Donbas region in favor of a peace deal.
“Trump has not put serious pressure on Ukraine to accept such terms,” he says. “In fact, from what I hear, the Russians are complaining that he has not done so.”
Herbst also views recent momentum in Congress to force a vote on additional aid to Ukraine as a reflection of enduring bipartisan support among the American public and a weakening of Trump’s influence over congressional Republicans.
“The largest majority of congressmen — including many Republicans — support aid to Ukraine. Whether they’re willing to cross the president is still a question mark,” he says.
The following interview, conducted on May 14, 2026, has been edited for length and clarity.
Mariia Ulianovska, Independence Avenue Media: We are in the fifth spring of Russian full-scale war against Ukraine. How do you assess where things stand?
John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center: There’s no question that over the past two or three months, the war has moved in a direction favorable to Ukraine. And there are three main reasons for this.
The first is the situation on the front line. Over the past two months, Russia has made no gains. Ukraine, on the other hand, has made a few small gains — several hundred square kilometers. More importantly, Russian casualties have exceeded 30,000 people per month, which is very high.
Ukrainian Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov has set a goal of inflicting 50,000 Russian casualties per month. My understanding is that at least 60% of the wounded are unable to return to combat. This is a very high ratio of seriously injured troops.
At the same time, Russia has not been able to recruit enough personnel to replace those killed and wounded, with a shortfall of roughly 2,000 troops per month.
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This is important because Putin has stated — and sadly we’ve seen senior American officials repeat this — that Ukraine should give up western Donbas, which Russia demands, because the Russians will take it anyway. This is even though the Russians have been conducting this big invasion for four years and three months and have been unable to take it.
The second factor is Ukraine’s ability to strike Russia’s strategic industries with the extraordinary drone technology. They have taken out as much as 40% of Russia’s oil refinery capability, not to mention the havoc that Ukraine is causing in Crimea. We’re beginning to see some limitations placed on supplies to the peninsula and Russia is not able to conduct the drone operations from Crimea that heavily plagued Ukraine in 2023 and even 2024.
The third factor is the broader economic impact of these strikes on the Russian energy sector. Russia’s economy has been in difficult circumstances for several years. Even with the temporary suspension of some U.S. sanctions on Russian oil, the economy continues to struggle because it is operating under increasingly difficult conditions.
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IAM: We are talking the night after a massive Russian attack on Ukraine. Do you think the Ukrainian people feel as optimistic?
Herbst: I just returned from a trip to Kyiv, and there is no question that people felt better about their circumstances than they did during the winter.
The Ukrainian people have suffered greatly since the war began, and especially since the full-scale invasion. But as one Ukrainian politician from Kherson, who spent many weeks in a Russian prison, told me: almost all Ukrainians understand that however difficult it is to live under Russian bombardment, it is far worse to live under Russian occupation.
The Ukrainian people have demonstrated remarkable resilience because they want to live freely as Ukrainians — and that is impossible under Russian occupation.
The average Ukrainian can see what I see: Russia’s bombing campaign is aimed at making life unbearable for the Ukrainian people. Ukraine’s strikes, by contrast, are not directed at Russian civilians per se; they are making it harder for Putin to continue this war.
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IAM: Considering all this, how safe is Putin’s regime in Russia?
Herbst: There are clear signs of stress in Putin’s regime. It starts with the fact that this “special military operation” which was supposed to be over in weeks has now been going on longer than the Great Patriotic War for Moscow.
Even six or eight months ago, Russian elites and the war bloggers spoke as if Russian victory was still inevitable. Now there are high-profile Russian war bloggers who are saying that Russia can’t win this war.
People are beginning to complain as well. One Russian woman from Tuapse, where an oil facility was recently struck, said that people used to envy her for living on the Black Sea. Now, she says, it has become “hell” because “oil is raining from the sky.” Stories like this are spreading across Russia. So the war, and the consequences of a not successful war, are the first problem Putin has.
Second, Russia’s economy is in poor shape. In fact, senior people in the economic area say the Kremlin’s out of touch with the economy. That is partly because Putin does not know how to steward an economy. The only thing he knows how to do is to build up a financial reserve. At the same time, the war is placing increasing strain on the economy, especially as Ukraine inflicts growing damage on Russia’s most important source of foreign currency earnings: oil and gas exports.
The third reason is Putin’s growing repression — seriously limiting Telegram channels and the internet. Russians are complaining about this. Russians who always supported the regime are now talking publicly about their unhappiness.
These are all signs of a weakened regime. That could mean an effort to change it. I’m not predicting that’s going to happen now, but I would not be surprised if it happened tomorrow or a year and a half from now.
It was clear to me back in November of 2022 as I watched [Yevgeny] Prigozhin of the Wagner Group exchanging criticisms with [Sergei] Shoigu, then the minister of defense, [Valery] Gerasimov — the top general then and now, and [Chechen leader Ramzan] Kadyrov. I said, “This is not what’s supposed to happen in a stable authoritarian regime.” And then six or seven months later, we saw the attempted coup.
IAM: I’d like to turn to the peace negotiations. There is a perception that if a peace settlement is not reached by the beginning of the summer, it will become increasingly difficult to keep Ukraine high on the agenda as attention shifts to the U.S. midterm elections. How do you assess the U.S.-brokered peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine over the past year and a half?
Herbst: Well, they haven’t gone very far. It is clear for all to see. And to a large extent, it’s been only a negotiation between the United States and Ukraine. Russia to this point has not changed the goals Putin established when he launched [the war] — political control of Ukraine. And they’re not going to be satisfied with simply western Donbas, which for some reason the Trump administration thinks is all they want.
You’ve had negotiations that have not clearly advanced Trump’s stated goal of a stable peace. When Trump came into office, he said he wanted a stable peace based roughly on the lines where the armies were at the time. And the front lines today are not significantly different from where they were when he began his second term.
Trump also said that if one of the parties blocked a deal, he would put major pressure on them. Of course, there is only one party blocking a settlement. Trump has applied some pressure, including sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft, though he temporarily eased some of that pressure because of the situation with Iran, which I understand.
Still, he has been reluctant to apply pressure where it is most needed, and that is why the negotiations have not gone very far.
That said, I disagree with many of my colleagues who believe Trump intends to make it easier for Putin to take Ukraine by insisting on terms that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy could never accept and then forcing him to do so.
The idea that Ukraine should hand over Pokrovsk, Kramatorsk, or Sloviansk [in Ukrainian-controlled Donbas] is foolish. It would pose an existential danger to Ukraine and would also be dangerous for the United States. But Trump has not put serious pressure on Ukraine to accept such terms. In fact, from what I hear, the Russians are complaining that he has not done so.
IAM: Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently said that he hopes that these negotiations will resume. Do you see that there is a settlement to be reached before the midterm elections hit?
Herbst: Well, I have no doubt that Trump could make a good run at achieving the stable peace that he wants. To do that, he would need to follow through on the statements he made more than a year ago.
And, by the way, when he imposed sanctions on Russia in October [2025], that was consistent with those statements: that he would pressure the party responsible for blocking peace.
If he were to do that, the problems in Putin’s economy would worsen. And if that were coupled with efforts to transfer to Ukraine the remaining 210 billion euros of frozen Russian assets — it would place major strain on Putin and his war effort.
But so far, Trump has been reluctant to take those steps, and the U.S. position on frozen Russian assets remains very peculiar. In my judgment, it does not serve American interests, NATO interests, EU interests, or, of course, Ukrainian interests. It serves only Russian interests.
IAM: There is now congressional momentum for additional aid for Ukraine. There has been a bill that has recently gathered the 218 signatures required in the House of Representatives — including two Republican signatures, Don Bacon and Brian Fitzpatrick — to bypass Speaker Mike Johnson and vote for additional aid for Ukraine. What do you think this signals in terms of the U.S. support for Ukraine?
Herbst: It has always been clear that a very large majority of Americans — including a majority of Republicans and even a majority of MAGA Republicans — believe the United States should help Ukraine. They support providing aid to Ukraine at the level that existed before Trump returned to the White House, and they view Putin as a disreputable and dangerous figure. About 83% of Americans believe that.
Trump’s view has been somewhat different as we know. But he has been at least among Republicans a very powerful and popular figure. I should say popular and powerful — the power comes from the popularity.
But I think one of the reasons this measure has now moved forward is that Trump’s popularity has dropped a lot. He is still popular among Republicans, but his level of support has fallen, largely because of complications related to the war with Iran and the impact that has had on oil and gasoline prices in the United States.
That is how I interpret this vote. The measure passed with the support of at least two Republicans, even though many more Republicans would actually like to see aid to Ukraine move forward.
Trump’s ability to control the party is still there, but it is weaker. Not dramatically weaker, but weak enough to get that squeaker of a vote. And probably weak enough to ensure that when the House votes on actual aid to Ukraine, there will be a majority to pass it.
That is clearly a positive development for the United States and, of course, for Ukraine.
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IAM: It’s enough signatures to put it to a vote in the House of Representatives. What do you think are the prospects for this legislation in the House and then in the Senate? And do you think that more Republicans will vote for it if it’s put to a vote?
Herbst: I don’t rule out the possibility that more Republicans will vote for it. First, Trump is not as strong as he was four months ago. And if the vote takes place two months from now, with the war with Iran still ongoing and gasoline prices rising from roughly $4.40 a gallon today to $6 a gallon, support for the president in Congress could weaken even further.
Americans generally support aid to Ukraine. So I don’t have any doubt that the House will get a majority to vote for it. The Senate is not as certain because there are all sorts of procedural rules in the Senate. And while again, the largest majority of senators — including many Republicans — support aid to Ukraine. Whether they’re willing to cross the president is still a question mark.
IAM: President Trump is now on an official visit to China. What do you think is on the table for discussions between President Trump and President Xi Jinping around Ukraine and Russia?
Herbst: Trump understands that Russia and China act as partners. Some in the administration hope to somehow hive off Russia from that partnership with China. Sadly, they think the way to do that is to offer gifts to Putin, which is exactly the wrong way to go about this. You want to split them off, make it very painful for Russia to continue the war, make them give up the war in Ukraine, and then we have a conversation about how to address China’s long-term claims and ambitions regarding Russian territory.
IAM: Do you think China might potentially play a meaningful role in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine?
Herbst: Well, I think the Chinese foreign minister [Wang Yi] made Beijing’s position clear in his conversation with [European Commission President] Ursula von der Leyen a few months ago [July 2025], when he said that it is not in China’s interest for Russia to lose this war. I think that is absolutely correct.
China likes to present itself as a neutral party, but we all know that is not the case. At the same time, Chinese officials speak openly about their beneficial relationship with the Kremlin, and Russian officials emphasize that relationship even more.
Most importantly, we have yet to see China take any meaningful step that would make it harder for Putin to wage this war.
That said, it is true that a couple of years ago, when Putin was making reckless statements about the possible use of nuclear weapons, China reportedly told him that would be a very bad idea. To that extent, I would give Beijing some credit.
