Ukraine and its allies are still processing U.S. President Donald Trump’s Oct. 9 announcement of a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin for Russia to release hundreds of thousands of tons of diesel fuel to “the American and global market place.”
“This is sending a gift to Vladimir Putin,” says Evelyn Farkas, the executive director of the McCain Institute at Arizona State University and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia. “It’s not achieving the purported objective. Instead, what it’s achieving is further bringing Putin out of the diplomatic cold, and giving him money.”
Farkas, who says her first thought was “absolute shock” on hearing about Trump’s announcement, spoke to Independence Avenue Media on the sidelines of the annual Warsaw Security Forum on transatlantic security. She says many people had the same reaction she did.
Under the terms of the deal, Russia would supply 300,000 metric tons of diesel to U.S. and global markets in November, 500,000 tons in November and another 1 million tons afterwards.
“The allies here have known that President Trump has a prejudice toward President Putin, and against President Zelenskyy and against Ukraine. But he’s really showing this loud and clear, and in a way that potentially undercuts the sanctions and the overall European policy toward Russia,” she says. “And I think Europeans are just puzzled by that.”
Farkas, though, says Trump’s announcement and the subsequent war of words between him and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who has criticized the deal, should be taken as a continuation of a “dynamic” rather than a shift in policy.
“He has these moments where — I guess he’s testing what he can sort of try to get away with,” she says. But, she adds, “The United States is going to remain allied with Europe, with Canada, with the East Asian countries — because we have no choice.”
This interview was recorded on Oct. 12, 2026, and has been edited for length and clarity.
Glenn Kates, executive editor, English, Independence Avenue Media: Evelyn, it’s been an eventful three days. On Oct. 9, President Trump announced a deal with Vladimir Putin for the Russian president to begin releasing hundreds of thousands of tons of diesel fuel. Before I get to what’s happened since, I want to ask: what was your reaction when you heard about this?
Evelyn Farkas, executive director of the McCain Institute: Shock. Absolute shock, because this is sending a gift to Vladimir Putin. It’s essentially sending him some money, sending him a lot of political love, and frankly, not changing anything for the American people. So it’s not achieving the purported objective. Instead, what it’s achieving is further bringing Putin out of the diplomatic cold, and giving him money that he and the Iranians can use to fight against the U.S. in the Middle East, and our allies, our partners in Ukraine — and frankly, against us, because we are supporting Ukraine. So it did not make any sense to me in terms of a rational national security strategy and its execution.
IAM: When you talk about it being a gift to the Russian leader — is it more of a gift in economic terms for Russia, or is it about the signal that it sends about how Trump views this war and the importance of it?
Farkas: It’s absolutely the latter, Glenn. It’s telling the world that we are siding a little bit more with Putin. Because, of course, President Trump also came out with a statement saying that the democratically elected head of state of Ukraine, [Volodymyr] Zelenskyy, should leave, should be removed — I don’t remember what the verbs were. But clearly he knows full well that Ukraine cannot hold an election during the war that it’s waging, because of a million reasons — including a million men, and probably some women, fighting on the Ukrainian border. So the reality is that this is really just helping Vladimir Putin at a moment, frankly, when Vladimir Putin is desperate: there’s a stalemate on the front, and he’s under economic pressure.
IAM: And given that — given the timing of it — do you think Trump has given up on the idea of pressuring Russia to end the war? Or do you think this is a temporary thing before the midterms?
Farkas: I’m going to be blunt. I don’t think that President Trump ever was interested in putting pressure on Vladimir Putin as a man, as the head of state of — again — this country that launched an imperial, brutal invasion of Ukraine. He’s never indicated that he’s interested in doing that. In fact, he said the opposite: well, I think I need to speak nicely to Putin, because otherwise he won’t deal with me. This is a fatal misunderstanding of how Vladimir Putin behaves, how he operates. If you put pressure on him, he will be forced to capitulate. But if you don’t, he will continue to actually escalate — and that’s what he’s been doing, not just in Ukraine. I should remind the viewers that there have been hundreds of attacks — and I mean attacks, using bombs, using fire — on European sites: defense industrial sites, civilian airports, metro stations, storage depots. So the Russians have been escalating in a really dangerous way right now.
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IAM: I asked whether he’s given up on putting pressure on Russia because in September Congress passed and the president signed the Lindsey Graham sanctions legislation. What was the point of that whole effort? Was legislation passed and now we just forget about it? Or is there a chance to go back to that kind of thing?
Farkas: There’s fundamentally a disconnect between the president and the rest of America, frankly, starting with the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Congress, in an overwhelmingly bipartisan fashion, voted in the Senate in favor of sanctioning Russia for, again, its killing of innocent Ukrainian civilians in their homes every day, every night, and all the other brutal things that they’ve done that are illegal under international law. And the reality is that Congress is not only on Ukraine’s side, but the American people are — poll after poll. The American people understand that Vladimir Putin, that Russia, is the aggressor, not Ukraine, that Ukraine is indeed a victim. So I think that President Trump is out of sync with the American people. And then, of course, U.S. policy — not just congressional policy, but executive branch policy — remains to support Ukraine and its sovereignty. So he’s out of sync with his actual policy, which is a consistent policy that the United States has had since Russia illegally invaded in 2014.
IAM: The Ukrainians, by most accounts, were caught completely off guard. And the deal has been followed by this increasingly bitter war of words between Trump and Zelenskyy. Zelenskyy’s called the deal weak. And, like you mentioned earlier, Trump said that Ukraine needs to elect a new president. During the infamous Oval Office dust-up between Trump and Zelenskyy in February of last year, there was an all-hands-on-deck approach to salvaging that relationship, because obviously it’s an important relationship. What about this time? Are people talking about how they can fix this relationship? Or is this now different, 20 months into Trump’s second term?
Farkas: Look, we are so close to the midterm elections — which will change the political dynamic in the United States and the landscape within which President Trump is operating — that I think people are less focused on trying to convince him that he should be more gracious, if you will, toward, and supportive of the Ukrainian president. They’re focused on making sure that he doesn’t change U.S. policy: that he actually doesn’t provide this money for diesel fuel, that he doesn’t do something even more reckless and dangerous for innocent Ukrainians and, frankly, NATO and the international community, like withdraw U.S. intelligence-sharing cooperation. So I think you saw Republicans come out — Sen. Susan Collins, for example, who’s in a tough race in Maine, came out saying she is opposed to breaking the sanctions and providing money to Russia to fuel their war against Ukraine by buying diesel fuel. The senators, and by and large also on the House side, have reaffirmed their votes for sanctions — not for this weird opening, which won’t help America at all, or barely.
IAM: There’s been reporting in the Financial Times that the administration has threatened to stop intelligence sharing with Ukraine, and even to stop supplying military equipment through the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) program, which is the mechanism through which Ukraine is currently buying things like Patriot interceptors. How damaging could either of those things be, if implemented? And are there even legal implications for a decision to do either one of those things
Farkas: I think it would be incredibly damaging. But what I will say is that almost any of these damaging things that have happened to Ukraine, they’ve figured some way around. So Ukrainian ingenuity is not to be underestimated. Having said that, it is really important. And unfortunately, the Russians have been using these drones that are now jet-powered — probably with the help of China, they have these drones. And the reality is that they may also get access at some point to some of the ability to have more precise targeting — I’m told that if they have Starlink access, that would be a huge problem for Ukraine. And frankly, for us. We just don’t need to be handing Russia these kinds of opportunities. I think that there will be a pushback, however. We’re seeing it now, and certainly after the midterm elections we’ll see it. Congress will not stand for it. The American people won’t stand for it.
IAM: Yesterday, Trump announced on Truth Social a new energy ceasefire, saying that both parties had agreed. Ukraine said it was the first they’d heard of it. Moscow hasn’t said anything, but has continued to attack Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including a thermal plant in Kharkiv last night. Ukraine actually did say that, for now, they have unilaterally agreed to halt attacks on the refineries as they see what Russia does. But what options, given the threats from the administration, does Kyiv actually have right now?
Farkas: I think Kyiv needs to do what it has to do to defend itself from Russia. And I think that President Zelenskyy is right to take the opportunity. He genuinely does want a real ceasefire — he would actually like an end to the war, but he’d take a real ceasefire. But we’ve seen Russia, essentially — how do I put this? — they’re thumbing their noses in the face of the U.S. president. Every time President Trump says there’s a ceasefire, Russia basically says: no, there isn’t. It’s as if they’re trying to humiliate President Trump — and America, frankly. Look, at the end of the day, if we let Russia win, it’s a loss for America. I think that’s what everyone needs to understand, because Russia will continue. They will destroy NATO, and then they will come after the United States. Make no mistake: the Russians don’t like America. They don’t want to be friends with America. They want to weaken America. It doesn’t matter who’s in the White House. So I think these are fundamental geopolitical realities stemming from the current imperialist foreign policy that the Kremlin is pursuing.
IAM: Evelyn, you’re in Warsaw right now at the Warsaw Security Forum, which is dedicated to strengthening transatlantic security. Tell me: what’s the mood right now?
Farkas:I think people are having the same reaction I had to President Trump’s various statements on his Truth Social account. The allies here have known that President Trump has a prejudice toward President Putin, and against President Zelenskyy and against Ukraine. But he’s really showing this loud and clear, and in a way that potentially undercuts the sanctions and the overall European policy toward Russia. We need to keep Russia isolated, because it’s imperative that we defeat Russia. And this is also tied to the Middle East, because Russia is supporting Iran, China is supporting both countries, and these countries are killing Americans — or, Iran is killing Americans, again, supported by China and Russia. So to pretend that that’s not happening is also really naive. And I think Europeans are just puzzled by that, and alarmed by it, because it shows a lack of strategic understanding on the part of the United States government.
IAM: Given that it feels like this conversation’s been taking place for the last 20 months, are the Europeans still considering the possibility of counting on the United States less than they have in the past? And do they have a plan, if that’s what it ends up coming to?
Farkas: They’ve been accelerating their planning. They have regional plans. So, for example, the Baltics, the Nordics, Poland — those countries; I forget how many countries it is, maybe seven or eight — they’re cooperating on operational planning and exercising to defend themselves, even if they don’t have the United States, or even other parts of NATO, interested in joining. NATO is the strongest collective security alliance in the world. It’s the only operational one — because we do have the U.S. with Korea and with Japan, but NATO, operationally, is way stronger. They’ve operated in war together. And so we know that this alliance can be very strong, when the United States and when all nations agree. But the Europeans are not naive, and they’re proceeding with their planning — and then, of course, equipping. That has been slow, but they are trying to ramp up as much as possible. And frankly, some of the alarm is driven by the fact that this pressure is coming on Ukraine. Because if anything were to happen to Ukraine, again, as I said before, they would be next.
IAM: NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, presented the theory of victory for NATO in Warsaw today. How do you assess what he said?
Farkas: I think it was very strong. He has a strong plan. I think it’s good that he came out and talked about it, because normally it’s something that kind of goes without saying. But because of Russia’s aggressive activity — as I mentioned, all of these terrorist attacks across Europe — I think the supreme allied commander felt that he had to say something publicly. The reality, though, of course, is what you hinted at before, which is: NATO will be ready, and that should deter Russia. But the other part of deterrence is the political will. So that’s why the Europeans are also moving ahead with their own planning, to make sure that they can defend their space in case there’s some kind of lag in NATO decision-making. And that’s understood anyway, under normal NATO doctrine — that was always the case, that there would potentially be a lag, certainly before U.S. forces got involved. But now they’re not taking any chances in Europe, so they’re moving as fast as they can.
IAM: Evelyn, just one final question for you. So much effort has been spent by European partners trying to get Trump on side in the 20 months since he’s been president. And it did seem like some progress was being made — we already talked about the sanctions legislation that was signed last month. Do you see these past three days as a bump in the road? Or have we crossed a certain Rubicon between the Trump administration and the United States’ traditional Western allies, and Ukraine?
Farkas: I don’t think it’s a change in our relationship. It’s a dynamic we saw before. We saw it in that Oval Office meeting that you referenced. We saw it when President Trump took office in January [2025] and he started blaming Ukraine for the war publicly, on television. He has these moments where — I guess he’s testing what he can sort of try to get away with, in terms of convincing people that his perspective on this is somehow correct, when it’s not. So there are these moments. It’s a dynamic that repeats itself. I think that the allies have done a good job managing the relationship, and they should continue to do so. The United States is going to remain allied with Europe, with Canada, with the East Asian countries — because we have no choice. The only way we beat China is with all of our allies and partners. And believe me, we don’t want to live under a Chinese communist command economy.
