Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer says the U.S.-Israeli operation against Iran shows the limits of Russia’s global partnerships.
“If you are now a partner of Russia, in most cases, if you get into trouble, you can count on supportive words from Moscow, but not much else,” Pifer tells Independence Avenue Media.
Russia and Iran ratified a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty last year, deepening political and security cooperation between the two countries.
China, which signed its own 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Iran in 2021, has reacted similarly to the current crisis.
“I think what you’re seeing right now is China, like Russia, has been expressing some verbal support and some criticism of the American military action,” says Pifer. “But China’s not really doing anything.”
According to The Washington Post, Moscow is providing Tehran with intelligence on potential U.S. targets in the region.
Pifer says an extended Middle East conflict can also have consequences for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Western-supplied air defense munitions, now being used in a new conflict zone, may be less likely to reach Kyiv. Russia’s economy may also benefit from an increase in the price of oil and gas.
The following interview, recorded on March 5, 2026, has been edited for length and clarity.
Kartlos Sharashenidze, Independence Avenue Media: Ambassador Pifer, Russia and Iran signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement last year. Moscow has condemned the U.S. operation in Iran. What do you make of Russia’s reaction, and what would you expect from Russia under this partnership with Iran?
Steven Pifer, former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine: The Russian reaction to the American and Israeli strikes that are taking place now is very similar to the Russian reaction when the United States attacked Iranian nuclear facilities back in June of 2025, and very similar to when the American forces seized the leader of Venezuela, [former Venezuelan President Nicolas] Maduro. There are expressions of solidarity with Iran, condemnation of the United States, but Russia really doesn’t do anything.
What you’re seeing is that, Russia now, having been bogged down for more than four years since they launched the major invasion of Ukraine, doesn’t have much appetite, and they certainly have limited ability, to project power far beyond their borders.
IAM: You already mentioned Venezuela — at the beginning of this year, we saw the U.S. operation in Venezuela, and now the strikes against Iran. So, what do these developments suggest about the state of Russia’s global partnerships today?
Pifer: If you are now a partner of Russia, in most cases, if you get into trouble, you can count on supportive words from Moscow, but not much else.
IAM: Iran has been one of the key supporters of Russia’s war in Ukraine, and Russian forces have used Iranian Shahed drones extensively. What implications could the current developments in Iran have for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine?
Pifer: I think that there are probably three implications. One is, of course, there’s a lot of focus, particularly in Washington, D.C., now on Iran, and that means less attention for the Russia-Ukraine war.
A second implication is that you have seen oil prices increase. That will be very welcome in Russia, because the Russian oil revenues in December and January were at historically low levels. So they’ll see that oil price gain as providing greater revenues for the Russian budget.
The third implication is that, for the kind of air defense interceptors that Ukraine needs, particularly to intercept Russian ballistic missiles, there’s now greater demand on those assets for use in the Persian Gulf region. So I think there are some implications that may make things a bit more difficult for the Ukrainian side in the near term.
IAM: You didn’t mention the ongoing peace talks. How might the developments in Iran influence the diplomatic dynamics between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine?
Pifer: On the American side, really the person who’s deciding this is President Trump. And to the extent that he’s focused more on the Persian Gulf and Iran, he’s less focused on Russia and Ukraine.
Although I’m not sure, in a practical sense, if it really has much impact, because I don’t think that the negotiations that have been mediated by the Americans are really bringing us closer to an end of the Russia-Ukraine war.
And I think the fault really lies with Mr. Trump, because he has failed to back his diplomacy with pressure on the recalcitrant party [Russia] in these negotiations. Look, over the past year, you have seen significant suggestions by the Ukrainians that they are prepared to be flexible and even make what will be very painful decisions with regards to accepting some Russian de facto occupation of Ukrainian territory.
You have seen no reciprocal movement by the Russian side. My own conclusion is that the Russians, because [Russian President Vladimir] Putin still believes he can achieve his goals on the battlefield, are not negotiating seriously. They want to give an appearance of negotiating so that they can string Mr. Trump along and prevent him from imposing new sanctions on Russia.
But the reality is that unless Mr. Trump takes a tougher view and puts greater pressure on Moscow, the negotiating effort, I think, is going to fail. And that will be Mr. Trump’s failure.
IAM: Ambassador, you mentioned that the United States and its partners are using some of the same air-defense systems in the conflict with Iran that Ukraine relies on. What does this mean for Ukraine in the coming weeks and months as it continues to defend itself against Russia?
Pifer: Perhaps the most critical need that Ukraine has from the United States right now is Patriot interceptors to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. There is now a greater demand in the Gulf region by both American forces and American partners in the Middle East for those missiles. So I think that pressure will make it harder for Ukraine to receive more Patriot missiles.
I would note that the Ukrainians do have an asset that they could offer to the United States and other partners in the Persian Gulf, which is that the Ukrainians have developed a huge amount of expertise at intercepting these Iranian Shahed-type drones. I think they’ve come up with much more cost-effective ways of intercepting those drones than right now are being used in the Persian Gulf.
So to the extent that Ukraine has the possibility — because of course Ukraine has to use those first and foremost to defend its own airspace — to provide some of that to help out in the Persian Gulf, I think that would be very beneficial for the United States and for other Persian Gulf countries.
IAM: What implications could these developments have for Iran’s neighbors in the South Caucasus?
Pifer: I think this morning there were reports that a couple of Iranian drones had struck targets inside Azerbaijan. It seems that part of the Iranian strategy is to attack a lot of neighboring states, to try to somehow pull them into war. It’s a calculation that Iran makes — I assume they conclude it will be to their benefit.
I’m not sure I personally understand the logic, because it seems to me that the more neighbors Iran attacks, the greater risk it finds itself fighting not just the United States and Israel, but also its neighbors.
IAM: On China, with a possible meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in the near future, what do the developments in Iran mean for U.S.-China relations and the context of that meeting?
Pifer: I think what you’re seeing right now is — again — China, like Russia, has been expressing some verbal support and some criticism of the American military action. But China’s not really doing anything. The Chinese also have an additional concern, which is that about 40% of the oil that comes out of the Persian Gulf goes to China.
And I suspect that the Chinese are concerned that if Iran does succeed in either shutting down the Strait of Hormuz or targeting a significant number of tankers, so that tankers stop going, at some point down the road that could have an impact on China’s energy situation. But I’m not sure that the Chinese can play much of a role to try to facilitate a solution between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other.
IAM: Looking at the bigger picture, how might the developments around Iran reshape the broader geopolitical landscape?
Pifer: I think it’s very difficult to tell at this point. We don’t know how this war between the United States, Israel and Iran will play out.
Part of the confusion is that I don’t think the administration has yet defined for itself what its clear objective is. We’ve heard multiple objectives expressed over the last six days. They include ending Iran’s nuclear program. Well, you know, the president last summer said he had obliterated that program already.
We’ve seen them talking about concern about the Iranian ballistic missiles and concern that Iran might have an intercontinental ballistic missile or be developing one. There’s no evidence that I’ve seen to suggest that Iran is close to a missile that could reach the United States. And then there’s also been some talk — and look at the campaign going after Iranian leaders — that this is about regime change. The specific goal that is driving American participation in this war is going to have a big impact on how long this war continues.
And again, I think the administration thus far has put a lot of goals out there, but there’s confusion and there are contradictions, and it’s not totally clear exactly what the administration wants to achieve. And the more ambitious their goals are, the longer this could drag on. I mean, if they are serious about regime change — if you look back over the last 85, 90 years, there’s no case where air power alone succeeded in changing a regime. Even when you put ground forces there, I think in the American case, since World War II, you could claim success in Panama, but in every other case where there was a goal of regime change, even ground forces failed to do that. My guess is that Mr. Trump very much does not want to put American troops on the ground in Iran.
IAM: Well, the administration says this is not a war — and not a so-called regime-change war.
Pifer: Yeah, well, right now it is a war of choice. It’s interesting, Republicans in Congress don’t want to call it a war, but in the last two days President Trump has called it a war and the secretary of defense has called it a war. It’s a silly semantic argument.
And I think it’s being used in part by Republicans because, one, they don’t want to oppose Trump and vote against a War Powers Resolution, but on the other hand, they don’t want to have a vote on a War Powers Resolution because they don’t want to be seen as voting for this in case the war goes bad.
They don’t want to vote now to authorize Mr. Trump to carry out military action, and then in the fall, just before elections — if America is still bogged down in that war — to have the fact that they voted to support it working against them.
This, I think, is quite frankly, an act of cowardice. The Constitution provides that this should be a decision by the American Congress, and the Republicans are not prepared to carry out their congressional, their constitutional responsibility.
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