WASHINGTON (Independence Avenue Media) — Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace declaration at the White House on August 8 creating what’s being called the “Trump Route,” a transport corridor linking Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchevan through Armenia, monitored by a U.S. company.
“This agreement is a major blow to Russia because it puts the U.S. in a central role in securing the transit of goods,” said Michael Carpenter, former senior director for Europe at the White House National Security Council during the Biden administration. “It excludes Russia.”
Carpenter said the corridor will diversify trade routes in the South Caucasus. “Georgia will no longer be the sole choke point,” he said. “But I can guarantee you the United States and Europe will deepen relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan — and Georgia will be left out.”
He described Georgia’s trajectory as troubling. Once a top candidate for EU membership, the country has turned toward authoritarianism, punctuated by its passage of a “foreign agent” law modeled on Russia’s. The move prompted the U.S. to suspend its Strategic Partnership with Georgia and impose sanctions on Georgian officials.
Carpenter dismissed ruling-party claims of a Western “Global War Party” seeking to drag Georgia into war with Russia. “No one ever wanted to drag Georgia into the conflict,” he said. “Everybody understood Georgia was vulnerable — 20% of its territory is occupied by Russia.”
Georgia, he warned, risks losing out on the economic benefits of new East-West trade. “Right now, Georgia is on a road toward isolation and dependence on Russia and China,” Carpenter said. “That may be the government’s choice, but it’s not one many Georgians would accept if they saw where the country is headed.”
Still, he said, Georgia could change course. “It made one dramatic turn two years ago. It could make another if its leaders decide it’s in their interest.”
On U.S. policy, Carpenter called the South Caucasus “a critically important region,” but said Washington has failed to back words with consistent action. “The strategies on paper have been fine, but the follow-through hasn’t cemented a lasting U.S. foothold,” he said.
The following interview was recorded on August 12, 2025, and has been edited for length and clarity.
Kartlos Sharashenidze, Independence Avenue Media: Ambassador Carpenter, on August 8, the White House hosted a summit where President Donald Trump welcomed Armenia’s [PrimeMinister Nikol] Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s [President Ilham] Aliyev for the signing of a peace declaration to end the decades-old conflict. Do you think this agreement can bring lasting peace to the South Caucasus?
Ambassador Michael Carpenter, former White House National Security Council senior director for Europe: I see the agreement as a step forward, and a lot of the elements of that agreement had been negotiated between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the previous administration that I worked in. A lot of those elements were agreed [to] between the two sides. They made a lot of [progress] themselves. So, I’m not claiming that the United States should get all the credit for it, but we did a lot of the diplomatic spadework in 2020, frankly, to get to the point where they could sign that agreement at the White House. I think it’s an unequivocally good step forward.
I am glad that the Trump administration has proposed a U.S. company to help with logistics on this transportation route between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchevan. I think that is an innovative step forward that allows for the signing ceremony to take place, and so I congratulate them on that. I think it’s excellent.
What remains to be seen is whether the two sides can square Baku’s demand that Armenia change its constitution. This is a long-standing demand from Azerbaijan and, frankly, it is going to take a long time because Armenia would have to implement a referendum. It would not be an easy process that could take place in a matter of months. Probably 2027 is the earliest that Armenia could change its constitution. And, of course, if there is a referendum, there’s no certainty that it would go the way that most analysts would like it to go, which is to endorse peace and to remove any potential tertiary statements that have been issued in the past — for example, in Armenia’s declaration of independence — that might suggest territorial claims to Azerbaijan.
So, it remains to be seen whether that gets in the way of ratification of the agreement. So far, the agreement has been signed but not ratified.
Sharashenidze: How might the ‘Trump Route’ reshape the region’s economic and strategic landscape, and what kind of U.S. presence would it establish in the region? Is this something new for you — this kind of U.S. engagement in the region?
Carpenter: It’s not entirely new — [though] in a very different context and not exactly parallel. When Russia was admitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO), there was an arrangement for a Swiss company to monitor the transit of goods from Russia into Abkhazia and [elsewhere in] Georgia. So, there is a precedent for involving private third-party companies in monitoring transit.
Carpenter: In this case, it’s not a corridor because there’s no extraterritoriality. Armenia preserves its sovereignty, but there is a trusted third party in the form of a future U.S. company that will bid on a contract to oversee the communications link between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchevan, hopefully ensuring that Azeri transit is not obstructed or harassed, and is allowed to proceed. That, in turn, will create the preconditions for the southern corridor through the South Caucasus to truly open as a destination for goods and raw materials coming from Central Asia to Europe, and vice versa — goods flowing from Europe to Central Asia.
This is a huge opportunity for Central Asian countries — Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, etc. — to ship raw materials through a route that avoids Russia and eventually reaches destinations in Europe.
By the way, this whole agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also a big blow to Russia because it puts the U.S. in a prominent position in securing the transit of goods. As I said, it excludes Russia.
Now, Russia has gained traction and influence in Georgia, which is a separate story, but at least as far as the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement goes, it really diminishes Russia’s influence.
Sharashenidze: You mentioned Georgia and said the Trump Route would be a good opportunity for countries to avoid Russia. But there’s already an existing middle corridor through Georgia. How do you see its future? There are some concerns that Georgia might lose its important role.
Carpenter: I think the creation of a corridor that would flow through Armenia will diversify the options available to international companies, and Georgia will no longer be the sole choke point through which East-West trade occurs south of the Caucasus Mountains.
But Georgia, in general, by moving closer to China, by moving closer to Iran, and by moving closer to Russia, is becoming less and less of a player in terms of economic integration with Western countries. Its EU membership prospects are as dim now as they have ever been. In fact, it’s a very dark time in Georgia.
The country is both moving in an authoritarian direction, and its prospects for joining the EU — not to mention NATO — are negligible.
Sharashenidze: Given Georgia’s strained relations with the West and the lack of restoration of the suspended U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership, how do you see the future of U.S.-Georgia relations?
Carpenter: Georgia has always had the most advanced democratic political system east of the Black Sea. It has been the region’s one democracy, a shining example of a pluralistic, vibrant civil society, and a country that was slowly but surely progressing toward Euro-Atlantic institutions. Even just two years ago, it had a real chance, I think, of joining the EU.
But then the powers that be in Georgia took a dramatic turn toward authoritarianism. They passed this foreign agent law and a number of other laws that allowed for offshore corruption — effectively legalizing corruption — and cracked down on civil society, basically making a strategic U-turn away from Euro-Atlantic integration.
That had its consequences.
The U.S. canceled the Strategic Partnership and imposed sanctions on some Georgian officials. The EU has followed suit. Politically, the country is almost unrecognizable today compared with where it was three years ago, let alone five or ten years ago.
Sharashenidze: A few weeks ago NATO held a military exercise in Georgia; last year the Pentagon postponed it. What does this shift indicate about Washington’s policy toward Georgia?
Carpenter: I wasn’t involved in the decision on this year’s exercise, but from what I’ve heard from colleagues, the idea was to continue professional cooperation between American and Georgian soldiers. That work should go on despite the politics clouding the broader relationship, and I don’t disagree with that approach.
I think it’s important for the U.S. to maintain ties with Georgian civil society and various Georgian actors and institutions, if at all possible.
But again, because the government has taken the country in such a different strategic direction, it’s very hard to see how we can sustain these sorts of partnerships over time. I think, without a fundamental change in Georgia’s strategic orientation, geopolitically and politically, it will be impossible for the United States to form a close partnership with that country or with the European Union, for that matter. That is deeply unfortunate, because the country really was moving and progressing in a direction that made those chances and opportunities very bright.
Sharashenidze: Can the South Caucasus be strong without a Georgia that has Western aspirations? What would it mean for the region if strained relations between Georgia and the West continue? And also, I’d like to ask you about the so-called “global war party” conspiracy theories coming from the Georgian Dream. What is your observation on this?
Carpenter: The “Global War Party” rhetoric is propaganda [manufactured] by the Georgian Dream government and those associated with it, and it’s just a tool to try to cast Western countries as intent on dragging Georgia into the Ukraine-Russia war, which is nonsense. No one ever wanted to drag Georgia into the conflict. Everybody understood that Georgia was vulnerable because 20% of its territory is occupied by Russia.
So, it’s complete nonsense and lies. But it was useful propaganda that the regime was able to use with segments of the population who feared another conflict might ruin their lives and livelihoods. One can understand that fear.
But the reality behind the propaganda has been a rapprochement with Russia that has resulted in far more hostile Russian activity in Georgia than existed beforehand.
And so, I think we have to see this as a smokescreen that allows Georgia and the Georgian government to get much closer to Moscow. That’s the reality behind this, plain and simple.
Can the South Caucasus be complete without Georgia? Well, we’re about to find out, but I can guarantee you that the United States and the EU are going to deepen relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. And Georgia is going to be left out. So, Georgia will have opportunities to do more business with Russia, but that’s going to come at a cost. Georgians really have to ask themselves if that’s what they want for their future.
Sharashenidze: More broadly, what should U.S. strategy be toward the South Caucasus? Do you think there is a clear strategy for the region at present? Was there one during the previous administration? And why is this part of the world important for U.S. national interests and security?
Carpenter: I think it’s a critically important region for U.S. interests. There have been various strategies over the years. I don’t know that they have been successfully implemented. The words on paper have been okay, but the actions that various administrations have taken — I’ll be critical of the last one as well — have not really cemented our strategic foothold.
Now we have an opportunity with this agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. I think there’s a lot of potential there. We have been talking to our ally, Turkey, about how to take advantage of this opening. I think Ankara sees a geopolitical shift in Armenia that they would like to exploit as well — to mend their ties with Armenia and de-isolate the country, which would, of course, bring prosperity and a modicum of security — both welcome outcomes.
And then the middle corridor would open up all kinds of opportunities for Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Central Asia.
Now, Georgia is in a different situation. Right now, we have to play defense a little bit there. But I think there is still hope — Georgia made a dramatic U-turn approximately two years ago, and they could make another dramatic U-turn in the future if the country’s leadership decides it is in their interest. So, I think we need to put together the incentives — for example, sanctions on actors who are engaged in repression and also a positive vision for what might happen if some of this repression is reversed — and hope that future elections will lead to changes in how the country approaches its strategic orientation.
Because right now, I think — it’s not for me to decide; that is for Georgians — but Georgia is on a road toward isolation and dependence on Russia and China. That, of course, is a choice. But it’s not a choice that I think many Georgians would accept willingly if they knew that is where the country is headed.
