The Shatterbelt Brief is a weekly column by Brian Whitmore examining the shifting political and geopolitical dynamics of Eastern Europe and Eurasia. The views expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of Independence Avenue Media.
It is going to be a frantic couple of months as negotiations to end Russia’s war against Ukraine have gained new momentum.
Talks in Oslo with Ukraine, the European allies and the United States have yielded a framework for future negotiations. Russian autocrat Vladimir Putin agreed “in principle” to three-way negotiations. And three-way talks including Ukraine, Russia and the United States are tentatively slated to start on Nov. 10 in Abu Dhabi.
U.S. President Donald Trump apparently hopes to seal a final deal at the G20 summit in Miami on Dec. 14-15.
So as we enter another flurry of chaotic and confusing diplomacy aimed at resolving Russia’s war against Ukraine, here are five things to keep in mind — and keep us grounded in reality.
1. The war will be decided on the battlefield
This war is ultimately going to be won or lost on the battlefield and there is no getting around that. The reason is simple: the objectives of Moscow and Ukraine are irreconcilable. Russia’s objectives are maximalist and eliminationist. Putin’s regime believes Ukrainian statehood is illegitimate and wants to end it. Ukraine’s goals are existential. Ukraine wants to continue to exist as a sovereign, independent and European state. This isn’t a real estate deal. It is an ideologically driven war of conquest on one side and a battle for survival on the other.
As I wrote for the Atlantic Council back in May 2025, “There is simply no magic formula, no concession, and no grand bargain that would satisfy the Kremlin’s maximalist and eliminationist goals…Any Kabuki negotiations or a Potemkin cease-fire would be meaningless and treated by the Kremlin as nothing more than a strategic pause and an opportunity for sanctions relief.”
Russia’s goals in the upcoming talks are twofold. First, the Kremlin is seeking to decouple the war from Russia-U.S. relations, normalize economic and political ties between Moscow and Washington, and end sanctions. And second, the Putin regime is seeking to coax the United States into ending any support for Ukraine and thereby weaken Kyiv’s capacity to resist.
The fastest way to end this war is to help Ukraine win it decisively. Period.
2. For Russia, ‘root causes’ are a euphemism for Ukraine’s very existence
Every time we hear a Russian official utter the words “root causes” red flags should go up immediately. The phrase has literally been used hundreds of times in official capacities since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. Just a casual search of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s official website shows that the phrase “root causes” (первопричины) is included in most formal statements regarding Ukraine. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov used the phrase twice in recent months and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin used it at least once.
So what does Russia mean by “root causes”? Kateryna Odarchenko wrote recently for The Atlantic Council, “this phrase has become the cornerstone of Russian diplomatic messaging” and reflects “the Kremlin’s refusal to accept the existence of an independent Ukraine.”
In other words, for Moscow, the “root cause” of the war is Ukraine’s very existence as a sovereign state capable of making its own decisions about its political future and geopolitical alignments.
And when we hear Russian officials insist that the “root causes” of the war be addressed, as we surely will as talks progress, this is effectively a demand for Ukraine’s unconditional surrender — and it should be a showstopper.
3. Russia is running a very effective ‘reflexive control’ operation
When Trump told reporters that “Russia, frankly, has been fine on Ukraine. They haven’t been doing much,” despite ongoing and crippling military strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilians, somebody in some dark office somewhere in Lubyanka was surely smiling. And they must have been positively giddy when Trump posted on social media that Zelenskyy “doesn’t want to end this war, and probably never did.”
The reason for the smiles is that these remarks illustrate the success of something the Russian security services call “reflexive control,” a doctrine developed by Soviet military strategists back in the 1960s that aims to compel adversaries to behave in a manner advantageous to Moscow. It does this by preemptively shaping the environment through disinformation campaigns, psyops, business ties, political meddling or any combination thereof.
“The idea behind reflexive control is to shape the environment in such a way that the enemy chooses Russia’s preferred course of action voluntarily, because it is easiest and all the others appear much more difficult and risky, if not impossible. Reflexive control allows a much weaker force to constrain and even control the activities of a much stronger force,” military analysts Frederick and Kimberly Kagan wrote in a 2015 report.
The key to a successful reflexive control operation is knowing the psychology of your interlocutor. By dangling potential business deals in energy, Arctic minerals, and real estate, and by presenting Ukraine as the sole obstacle to these lucrative ventures, Putin and his cronies are pushing all the right buttons. And for the moment it is working.
4. Ukraine and Europe understand what is happening
The Ukrainians have seen this movie before and know exactly what is happening. And so, increasingly, do the Europeans.
When Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a televised interview that it was “a pity that we are losing a strong partner” and that the United States was on “the wrong side of history,” it raised eyebrows. But it is what he added that suggests he understands exactly what is going on: “We can’t be weak. We’re not selling our country. Look, guys, it’s not about business for us. It’s our lives. It’s our country, our home, our children.”
The fact that Ukraine is clear-eyed about what is happening between Washington and Moscow explains why Zelenskyy has become increasingly forceful in calling it out. And it explains why the Europeans are hugging him tightly as Kyiv faces this changing geopolitical environment.
When Zelenskyy traveled to Oslo for talks with U.S. officials, he was joined by the leaders of Norway and Finland as well as representatives from Britain, France, Germany and Poland and officials from the EU and NATO to coordinate a unified stance. In other words, they were there to make sure Ukraine didn’t get rolled by the Americans.
The framework that emerged out of Oslo included postwar security guarantees for Ukraine, an economic recovery plan, and continued U.S. intelligence sharing with Ukraine. If the talks proceed to trilateral negotiations among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in Abu Dhabi in November as envisioned, continued European engagement will be essential to protect Ukraine’s interests.
5. It will take Ukraine and Europe time to replace U.S. capacity
It is always good advice to hope for the best but to prepare for the worst.
Ukraine and Europe are holding out hope that Washington will return to its traditional foreign policy posture of supporting Kyiv and maintaining its commitment to European security. But they increasingly understand that they also need to prepare for a world in which this is no longer the case.
Commentary: The Week That Shook Ukraine
This isn’t just about increasing defense spending, which the European allies are doing. And it isn’t just about Ukraine developing its own strong independent defense sector, which Kyiv is doing in spades.
At its core, it means developing the capacity to replace things that have been previously provided by Washington: air and missile defense and satellite intelligence.
As I wrote in this space last week, in the area of missile defense, the Freyja Project, an effort launched by a coalition of European nations and Ukraine to develop a low-cost alternative to the U.S. Patriot system could be operational by next year. European efforts to replace U.S. satellite intelligence capacity will likely take longer, with projects like IRIS² appearing to be years away.
The ability of Kyiv and Brussels to address these deficits quickly may turn out to be the key variable in Ukrainian and European security going forward.
