Russia is escalating its war in Ukraine with some of the heaviest missile and drone strikes since the full-scale invasion began in February of 2022. Dozens of civilians have been killed in recent weeks, including children, and diplomatic facilities have been hit. “Russia is escalating the war and Russia is escalating because we are not responding and leading with a strategy based on strength,” former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink tells Independence Avenue Media. [Editor’s Note: Amb. Brink is currently running for Congress in Michigan.]
Despite high-profile diplomacy led by President Donald Trump, Brink says Ukraine is “absolutely not” closer to peace. “Without a strategy, it’s hard to use the tools and levers of American power to help bring an end to the war,” she said. Brink argued that Washington should push for stronger sanctions, unlock $300 billion in frozen Russian sovereign assets in Europe, and enable partners to buy U.S. weapons to pressure Moscow. [Also read: Europe’s ‘Mental Prison’ Is Putin’s Advantage, Says German Defense Expert]
She dismisses the administration’s contention that both Russia and Ukraine need to desire peace. “The Ukrainian side is ready to stop the war immediately. The Russians have not agreed to do that,” she said. If Russia prevails, Brink warns, Putin will not stop at Ukraine. “First Ukraine, then Moldova, then others,” she said, noting the risks to NATO allies and the signal it would send to China. “The way to send the right signal to China is to use American power decisively to help end this war.”
The following interview, recorded August 29, has been edited for length and clarity.
Independence Avenue Media, Editor in Chief Ia Meurmishvili: Do you think we’re closer to peace in Ukraine after the recent diplomatic efforts led by U.S. President Donald Trump?
Former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink: Absolutely not. We are no closer to peace than we were when I left government or even when the Trump administration assumed office. I think we can be, but we have to use our pressure points to essentially make [Russian President Vladimir] Putin take the calculation to [bring] an end to the war.
Meurmishvili: What would that be? Everybody’s talking about how ‘we need to do more.’ It seems like everybody’s on the same page on that, but nothing is really changing. What needs to be done?
Brink: First of all, I think we need a strategy, and that’s the thing that I don’t see happening. Without a strategy, it’s hard to use the tools and levers of American power to help bring an end to the war. So I don’t think we need to have endless U.S. taxpayer money going to Ukraine. But what we do need to do is support partners in buying U.S. weapons. And that is happening. And that’s a good thing. I strongly support that. The Europeans are stepping up in ways that are very positive. Over a billion dollars of weapons will be bought from the United States, creating jobs.
But the second thing is [that] we can increase sanctions, and there’s a sanction package in Congress that’s quite strong. It should be very strong. And passing it would help to defund Russia’s war machine.
The third thing is to get a hold of the $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets that sits in Europe. That, too, can be used to buy U.S. weapons to help Ukraine defend itself. So there are plenty of ways that we can put more pressure on Russia to end the war.
Meurmishvili: Does the U.S. have any leverage on the Europeans as it relates to those $300 billion?
Brink: Sure, of course. I mean, we can push for it privately, we can push for it publicly, and that’s what we should be doing. At the end of the day, I believe this is the only logical thing to do — to give Ukraine enough to be able to defend itself. I don’t see another way to raise the kind of money that’s needed so that Ukraine has the weapons that it can stay free and secure.
Meurmishvili: We just saw the second-heaviest bombing of Kyiv in the past three-and-a-half years, which hit the British Council, a cultural organization, and EU offices, [killing at least 25 people]. Why do you think Putin appears to be escalating attacks on Ukraine after Trump’s Alaska summit?
Brink: Yes, you’re exactly right. Russia is escalating the war and Russia is escalating because we are not responding and leading with a strategy based on strength. I think that it’s very clear that Putin sees that he can play us, that he is playing [President Trump’s Special Representative in Peace Negotiations Steve] Witkoff, that in fact he’s playing Trump and buying time and changing facts on the ground in ways that aren’t helping move toward peace.
He’s also increasing attacks. This is happening since the change of administration. The war has in fact gotten worse. July marks a period where more missiles and drones were sent to Ukraine than any other time since the start of the war. July also marked the killing of more civilians than any other time since May of 2022. The war’s getting worse. Just two days ago, there was the biggest attack on Ukraine — I think second-biggest since the start of the war — with over 600 drones and missiles that, as you said, struck Kyiv and other places and killed people, including children. I mean, it’s horrific. There were more attacks overnight. This war is escalating and it’s escalating because we are not showing the strengths we need to show and working with allies and partners to stop it.
Meurmishvili: The White House statement on this latest attack was that both sides need to want to end this war. How do you interpret that? What does that mean?
Brink: Well, I guess in diplomacy, I always look at actions, not words. And what I see is that the Ukrainian side has shown in its actions and has shown in its efforts that it is ready to stop the war immediately. It is ready to have a full ceasefire. The Russians have not agreed to do that. What the Russians have done is continue the war and continue the way in which it is fighting that is increasing and escalating the war, not diminishing it, not stopping it.
Meurmishvili: There is a view in some parts of the administration that because of this war, Russia and China got closer to each other and that diplomatic efforts, especially not putting pressure on Russia, is guided by this principle that the U.S. needs to decouple Russia and China. Do you think that’s possible? Do you think that’s a good sort of strategy to have?
Brink: Absolutely not. I don’t think it’s possible. I definitely don’t think it’s a good strategy. I think that we have to recognize that how this war ends is going to affect the strategic competition that we have with China, because China’s watching what happens.
China is not going to be decoupled from Russia. I don’t believe the intelligence or any analysis indicates that that’s possible. But what I think is important is that if we can show the strength of ourselves working with our partners to put an end to the war, the biggest war in Europe since World War II, China will take note and that will have an impact on what China does in its own region.
So the idea of stopping arms flows to Ukraine or pulling our punches in regards to stopping the war and thinking that that helps us focus more on China is completely wrong in my view. The way to send the right signal to China is to use American power decisively to help end this war. And I think this is what we should do. I think this should be our strategy and to use our leverage toward that end.
Meurmishvili: There have been questions about why the U.S. should be involved or care. That Europe needs to be more involved, more engaged. Now, what is really at stake in Ukraine as it comes from the U.S. interest?
Brink: Well, what I see is there’s debate within the administration as to whether or not Ukraine or Ukraine’s freedom is in the strategic interest of the United States. I would say that it absolutely is in the interest of the United States to help keep Ukraine free. And of course it’s important to Ukraine and to Europe, but it’s also important to us. It’s very important that we show that Putin’s aggression will not be rewarded because I am sure that Putin will continue it in different ways.
First Ukraine, then Moldova, then others in the region potentially affecting our NATO allies, which will then put us in a place of making a decision about American troops and how we need to defend our own allies.
This, I believe, is vital to our security. As I mentioned, other would-be aggressors around the world are watching very closely. What is the American reaction to this blatant aggression? As I said, it’s the biggest aggression in Europe since World War II; 150,000-plus war crimes; 10,000-plus civilians killed; 700 children killed, missiles and bombs [by] the thousands — I lived under them personally — sent to civilian cities, [targeting] energy architecture, places that are not at all military. How do we react to that? The world’s watching. China’s watching. Other potential aggressors are watching. And we need to understand that the implications of what we do go far beyond Ukraine alone, far beyond Europe alone.
Finally, I [would] just say our relationship with Europe — and Ukraine, being a country located within Europe — is the vital relationship to our economic stability and success. It’s the most important trading partner. What happens on the European continent matters deeply to the United States. We know this from history. We also know from history that appeasing aggressors never leads to peace. We need to learn that lesson and we need to apply it. We also know that working together with our partners, with our allies — our longest-time allies in Europe — is how we can show the strength to create and have a community of democracies that are working together for the prosperity, for the betterment of all of our countries. And that’s what we need to do.
Meurmishvili: Ukraine has been very successfully taking out some of the Russian energy infrastructure. And there are some reports that Ukraine has taken out in the past week about 17% of Russia’s refinery capabilities. Is there anything that the West can do to maybe support or speed up the strategy from Ukraine?
Brink: Yeah, well, I assume the reason that the refinery capabilities are being targeted by the Ukrainians is because this is the way that Putin is funding this war — [with] oil revenue. That can be attacked in many different ways. I actually believe, myself, that this is a legitimate military target because of the economy of the war. And so we could do more, for example, by passing the Sanctions Act that’s now in Congress. That would go after the countries that are buying Russia’s oil around the world. We could also go after the “shadow fleet,” a fleet of ships that’s actually avoiding sanctions and delivering oil all around the world. There are many ways that we could also help go after that, and I think we absolutely should because it gets to the war machine that’s funding Putin’s war.
Meurmishvili: The Black Sea is turning into a strategic place for NATO — for a few years now and for Russia as well. Ukraine has basically taken out or reduced [the size] of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Now Russia is expanding on the other side of the Black Sea in Ochamchire, for example, occupied Abkhazia of Georgia. Russia is building submarine port [base there]. How do you look at the Black Sea from the U.S. interest standpoint? And where does the Black Sea and particularly Georgia fit into this strategic picture?
Brink: Well, the Black Sea is a very important strategic entity for us — a strategic place for the United States, for NATO. Three NATO allies sit on the Black Sea: Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. It’s the entryway or the crossroads for the Caucuses for Central Asia, for Eastern Europe, into the Mediterranean, and to the Middle East. So it’s incredibly important for things like Ukrainian grain, which helps to feed the world. Those grain exports are very important not just to Ukraine’s economy, but also to countries in Africa and around the world. That all goes out through the Black Sea.
It’s also really important for energy security. Much of the energy that comes from Central Asia and the Caucasus then also goes through the Black Sea. It’s no surprise that Russia is very interested in the Black Sea and in fact would very likely want to have total control of the Black Sea.
This is why Crimea was taken in 2014 and [why many say] this war did not begin in 2022, but long before — at least in 2014 — but also why Putin’s first effort was to create a land bridge between Russia and Crimea. That is essentially taking much more control over the Black Sea area. This should be a very important part of our strategy of keeping Ukraine free. Because the implications of Russia’s creeping annexation of all parts of the Black Sea is very detrimental to our own policy and our own goals — [not only] for Europe but for our NATO allies and for the United States. So we should keep a close eye on that and we should have this as part of all of our discussions.
